Police Self-Deployment at Critical Incidents: A Wicked Problem or a Part of the Solution?

– Executive Summary –

Police self-deployment refers generally to the unauthorized response of officers to critical incidents. However, existing literature provides no comprehensive definition and is confined to descriptive narratives in after-action reports. If the results of police self-deployment to an incident are undesirable or harmful, self-deployment is condemned. Conversely, if police respond to an event without authorization yet perform—if only in hindsight—daring and creative acts, these officers are cited as heroes and their response is judged a success. Without clear principles, preventing symptoms of self-deployment such as traffic congestion and diminished command and control is challenging; nevertheless, encouraging the ingenuity and initiative leading to heroic and lifesaving acts is equally difficult.

Police self-deployment is most problematic at critical or “black swan” events, especially in the chaotic first stages. Cynthia Renaud uses the term “edge of chaos” to describe this tumultuous period, equating it to a biological process whereby a cell may be created or destroyed.[1] Arguing that the edge of chaos is resistant to the forms and structure of the National Incident Management Systems (NIMS) and the Incident Command System (ICS) specifically, Renaud suggests that improvisation and creativity—hallmarks of self-initiated policing—are the best tools for responders during this period.

A basic understanding of federal protocol clarifies the role of police self-deployment in incident response. Since 9/11, command and control of resources at critical incidents means applying the NIMS, of which ICS is one tool.[2] ICS is a management structure designed to provide flexible, efficient, and effective command in critical incidents.[3] Developed by the fire service to fight wildfires, ICS prohibits self-deployment due to the dangers observed when firefighters freelance or respond individually. Fire departments nationwide have also adopted ICS in day-to-day operations. Law enforcement, unlike firefighting, has less use for ICS in daily operations. In fact, practitioners, policy makers, and researchers accept that ICS in policing has been less effective.[4] Nonetheless, in 2004, the Department of Homeland Security, through a series of presidential directives, mandated that ICS be used as the official template for incident response, and directly connected federal funding to its use by partner agencies.[5]

Many critical events, as well as most routine problems to which law enforcement responds, fall under the definition of wicked problems. First identified by Horst Rittel and Melvin Webber as unique to the realm of public policy, wicked problems span such intractable topics as poverty, terrorism, and the environment, and cannot be solved by traditional scientific methods. Rittel and Webber have identified ten characteristics of wicked problems—they are not a series of tests to mechanically determine “wickedness,” but rather insights to judge whether a problem is wicked.[6] Mark Wexler expanded on the morality of these wicked characteristics, specifically in a public planning context. This thesis proposed that viewing police self-deployment through the wicked problem lens clarifies the definition, encompassing what appears to be both a necessary role and a significant problem at critical incidents.

This thesis asked the following questions: How can police self-deployment be better defined and understood through the lens of wicked problems? How can this understanding be used to exploit good police self-deployment, reduce instances of bad self-deployment, and enhance law-enforcement response to evolving critical incidents that employ ICS? To answer these questions, the case narratives from the 2013 Christopher Dorner manhunt in southern California and the 2013 Boston Marathon bombings were first examined to identify specific instances of police self-deployment as they related to ICS. These incidents were assessed for setting, outcome, and ICS implementation. Then, police self-deployment incidents during the Dorner manhunt and in Boston were measured against each of Rittel and Webber’s ten characteristics and Mark Wexler’s four moral traits.

A case study approach provided the opportunity to examine detailed aspects of the self-deployment problem in critical incidents. The events examined as case studies—the Christopher Dorner manhunt and the Boston Marathon bombings—were chosen for their similarities and differences. Both events involved police as the primary responders and spanned several days, necessitating the establishment of ICS. In addition, the events demonstrated multiple episodes of self-deployment with both good and bad results. The event differences highlight the endemic nature of self-deployment to the profession of policing. The Boston Marathon bombings were a terrorist incident that occurred at a fixed urban event in Massachusetts. The Dorner manhunt involved the search for a murderer on an unpredictable rampage throughout southern California, traversing hundreds of miles through vastly different climates. The agencies that responded to both incidents had different jurisdictional responsibilities and varied in size—from the six officers working a shift in Watertown, Massachusetts, to the 1,000 Los Angeles Police officers assigned to daily protective details. Nevertheless, both incidents underwent comparable and repeated issues with self-deployment.

This thesis concluded that police self-deployment is a wicked characteristic of law enforcement and recommended that law enforcement embrace educational methods to improve response. By using open-ended training scenarios, safe spaces for discussion, and collaborative problem-solving, officers may assume more responsibility for their actions and receive recognition for a positive response. Acceptance of police self-deployment also enables supervisors to effectively manage problems by involving street-level officers in decisions. A related recommendation is to create a national after-action report database and a standardized reporting format. These will encourage nationwide inter-agency and professional collaboration—one of the best ways to deal with wicked problems. A centralized database can provide a safe and secure place to share relevant information for all response agencies.

The existing authoritative command structures found in ICS do not encourage the ingenuity and creativity often seen when officers self-deploy to a crisis event at the edge of chaos. Police officers are accustomed to working in this environment, making do with what is available. Nonetheless, ICS authoritative command still fails to prevent the negative forms of self-deployment from occurring, as illustrated in the case studies. A final policy recommendation is for ICS to recognize the edge of chaos and provide guidance for police response during this time.

[1] Cynthia E. Renaud, “Making Sense in the Edge of Chaos: A Framework for Effective Initial Response Efforts to Large-Scale Incidents” (master’s thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 2010), 11.

[2] Department of Homeland Security, National Incident Management System (Washington, DC: GPO, 2008), 1.

[3] FEMA, “Working Draft: National Incident Management System Refresh,” Center for Threat Preparedness, May 2, 2016, 1, http://www.dhhr.wv.gov/healthprep/eventsandannouncements/Pages/NIMS-Refresh-Engagement-Update.aspx.

[4] Dick A. Buck, Joseph E. Trainor, and Benigno E. Aguirre, “A Critical Evaluation of the Incident Command System and NIMS,” Journal of Homeland Security and Emergency Management 3, no. 3 (2006): 5.

[5] The White House, Management of Domestic Incidents (Homeland Security Presidential Directive 5) (Washington, DC: White House, 2003), 5.

[6] Horst W. J. Rittel and Melvin M. Webber, “Dilemmas in a General Theory of Planning,” Policy Sciences 4 (1973): 155–169.

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