Michael Pfaltzgraff's thesis
– Executive Summary –
One of the most stressful and dangerous situations a firefighter may ever encounter is calling a Mayday – when a firefighter is trapped, lost, disoriented, or otherwise incapable of getting to safety. Between 2015 and 2021, the United States Fire Service experienced 18,697 Mayday events.[1] Almost one-half of successful Mayday rescues were accomplished by the endangered firefighters themselves.[2] To maximize the chances of survival, firefighters in these situations need to remain calm and think clearly to analyze their situation. Over the past four decades, changes in building construction and furnishings have significantly decreased the time available for the decision-making process. Once a fire starts, the time to flashover (total involvement of the room) is less than four minutes in modern homes, compared to more than thirty minutes in older homes.[3] This decrease in discretionary time enhances the reliance on recognition-primed decision-making (RPD). The RPD process is based on intuitive or naturalistic decisions based on an individual’s past experiences.[4] Upon completing basic training, recruit firefighters have minimal expertise on which to base RPD processes. Once released to the field, trainee firefighters today receive less on-the-job training due to increasing call demands. Although overall call volume nationwide increased from 10.8 million calls annually in 1980 to 36.4 million annually in 2020, the incidence of fires decreased by 53%.[5] The increase in other call volume and the decrease in fire responses limit the amount of experience firefighters gain as references in the RPD process. The lack of on-the-job training places greater demands on the basic training environment while firefighters learn basic skills. Fire service training programs include hands-on training, but teaching every possible scenario a firefighter may encounter is impractical. The bunker-like construction of most live-fire-training structures contributes to minimal scenario variability. This results in trainees performing skills of a repetitive nature and reinforcing learned skills, but does not result in teaching critical thinking, and may contribute to overconfidence in the real-world environment. Research has shown firefighters may execute learned responses without recognizing subtle situational differences, leading to flawed decision-making based on the application of incorrect RPD references.[6] When faced with extreme stress, an individual makes a rapid assessment of whether their available resources are sufficient to meet the demands of the situation. When stress overwhelms the ability to cope, an individual may experience tonic immobility – profound motor inhibition and unresponsiveness to stimuli.[7] In the fire service training environment, instructors are constantly present, and trainees most likely never encounter this feeling of being overwhelmed. Once released to the field, however, an individual who becomes lost or separated from their crew must recognize situational cues and make RPD-based decisions without assistance to affect their own survival. The airline and spaceflight industries face similar high-risk consequences for inadequate decision-making. These professions have incorporated Stress Exposure Training (SET) into their basic pilot and astronaut training programs, commonly by introducing fire or smoke in their simulation programs – stressors already present in fire service training. The fire service must explore ways to induce stress in the training environment to ensure firefighters maintain the ability to think critically when faced with a Mayday situation.
This thesis explores how tactical silence affects recruit firefighters’ performance when performing practical training in a Combined Skills Evolution. The use of tactical silence from the instructional staff will increase the stress levels experienced by the recruits, resulting in longer times to complete and higher average heart rates during the evolution. Eleven recruit firefighters were randomly assigned to the experimental or control groups and equipped with wireless heart rate monitors before conducting the evolution. All individuals completed the Maryland Fire and Rescue Institute (MFRI) Firefighter I, Firefighter II, and Firefighter Survival and Rescue (FSR) courses prior to the experiment. The recruits previously learned to successfully navigate each obstacle presented in the Combined Skills Evolution. However, they had not navigated from obstacle to obstacle continuously. Each individual was equipped with full structural firefighting personal protective equipment, self-contained breathing apparatus, and a Smoked Out Series face shield to obscure their vision. The participants navigated the Combined Skills Evolution course, during which time to complete and heart rate were monitored. During the first attempt, the experimental group received no guidance or support from the instructional staff and operated in tactical silence. The control group received support, advice, and instruction from the staff as they navigated the course. Core elements were rearranged before a second attempt at the course to ensure a different scenario for both groups. Both groups operated under tactical silence during the second attempt and received no instructor support.
During the first attempt at the course, the experimental group completed the course in an average of 26.03 minutes. Compared to the control group’s average of 18.05 minutes, the experimental group took 44% longer to complete the course. On the second attempt, the experimental group completed in an average of 14.87 minutes, while the control group completed in 16.33 minutes. The experimental group completed the second run 10% faster than the control group. Data analysis of the first attempt showed a significant difference in times between the experimental and control groups (t(7) = 2.43, p = .023). Additionally, there was a significant difference in time for the experimental group between the first and second attempts (t(6) = 3.54, p = .006). Although the course was reconfigured, it is important to note there was no significant difference for the control group between the first and second runs (1.72-minute difference compared to the 11.16-minute difference for the experimental group). When comparing the control group’s first and second attempts, there was no significant difference, and there was also no significant difference on the second attempt between the experimental group and the control group.
Comparing the average heart rates of the two groups, the first attempt recorded an average heart rate of 165 beats per minute (bpm) for the experimental group and 157 bpm for the control group. The experimental group had an average heart rate of 161 bpm on the second attempt, and the control group had an average of 152 bpm on the second attempt. Data analysis of heart rates shows no significant differences between the two groups or the two attempts.
When faced with operating independently without instructor support, the experimental group took significantly longer to complete the course. Had this been an actual Mayday event, the difference in time could have resulted in the death of the firefighter. Fires can develop to the point of flashover in less than four minutes. Any time delay in exiting a structure fire is crucial. Recruits who operated in a condition of tactical silence during their first attempt performed significantly better on their second attempt at the Combined Skills Evolution. Although there were no significant differences in heart rate, sampling with a larger group or comparing test heart rates against baseline heart rates may yield different results.
This study demonstrates the need for a shift in the prevailing fire service training model. Even if recruits are successful in the training environment when they are supported and guided by their instructors, their first exposure to an event where they are isolated from help and support can significantly affect the time required to extricate themselves from danger. Future training programs should include capstone scenarios where instructors are present for safety only and do not provide instruction to students. The broader topic of stress training in the fire service warrants further discussion and research. This experiment evaluated the use of tactical silence to induce stress in the training environment. However, this research did not include Stress Inoculation Training to teach techniques to manage stress during an emergency response. Additionally, when comparing the results of both groups, it is important to note both groups already completed the Combined Skills Evolution when conducting their second attempt. To gain a clearer perspective of performance differences, a comparison should be made between the experimental group on the second run and the first run of a third comparator group on an identical course. Further research should also evaluate other means of stress measurement to gain an accurate perspective of the effect of tactical silence in a fire service training environment. The physical stress of wearing full protective equipment and self-contained breathing apparatus may overwhelm the statistical significance of the psychological stress induced through tactical silence.
Firefighting is a hazardous occupation, and firefighters will continue to make split-second decisions with limited information. The responsibility of the training environment is to prepare firefighters for the emergencies they will encounter during their careers. It is impractical, however, to present every scenario they will ever face. Teaching critical thinking while under stress is crucial to a firefighter’s survival, and the fire service needs to explore Stress Inoculation and Stress Exposure Training programs used in similar high-reliability professions for adaptability and inclusion in fire service training.
[1] Don Abbott, “2021 Career Part 1 of 2,” Don Abbott’s Project Mayday, accessed July 19, 2022, http://www.maydaystudy.com/; Don Abbott, “2021 Volunteer,” Don Abbott’s Project Mayday, accessed July 19, 2022, http://www.maydaystudy.com/.
[2] Abbott, “2021 Career Part 1 of 2”; Abbott, “2021 Volunteer.”
[3] Stephen Kerber, “Analysis of Changing Residential Fire Dynamics and Its Implications on Firefighter Operational Timeframes,” Fire Technology 48 (2012): 888, https://doi.org/10.1007/s10694-011-0249-2.
[4] Scott Carrigan, “Fireground Decision-Making: A Qualitative Study” (research paper, Executive Fire Officer Program, National Fire Academy, 2015), 5, https://nfa.usfa.fema.gov/pdf/efop/efo48927.pdf; Gary Klein, “The RPD Model: Criticisms and Confusions: Six Challenges to the Recognition-Primed Decision (PRD) Model,” Seeing What Others Don’t (blog), February 9, 2021, https://www.psychologytoday.com/us/blog/seeing-what-others-dont/202102/the-rpd-model-criticisms-and-confusions.
[5] Carrigan, “Fireground Decision-Making,” 9; Rita F Fahy et al., Fire Service in the United States: Trend Tables (Quincy, MA: National Fire Protection Association, 2022), 16.
[6] Paul M. Junger, “The Effects of Hypervigilance on Decision-Making during Critical Incidents” (master’s thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 2018), 47, https://hdl.handle.net/10945/60416.
[7] Carlos Eduardo Norte et al., “Tonic Immobility in PTSD: Exacerbation of Emotional Cardiac Defense Response,” Frontiers in Psychology 10, no. 1213 (May 2019): 1, https://doi.org/10.3389/fpsyg.2019.01213
