Nicholas Barker's thesis
– Executive Summary –
This thesis presents an analysis of New York City’s counterterrorism efforts, emphasizing the importance of interagency information sharing. It evaluates whether the lack of a dedicated fusion center impacts New York City’s ability to prevent and respond to terrorist threats and address persistent interagency information sharing inadequacies.
Preventable harm to New York City Police Department (NYPD) and Fire Department of the City of New York (FDNY) personnel underscores the dire consequences of fragmented communication and siloed intelligence. When agencies operate independently rather than as a unified public safety apparatus, it can put lives at risk, as illustrated by the 2014 assassinations of NYPD Officers Liu and Ramos and the 2016 Kingsbridge explosion that killed FDNY Chief Fahy.[1] Despite having advanced capabilities, including the NYPD’s Counterterrorism and Intelligence Bureaus and the FDNY’s Center for Terrorism and Disaster Preparedness, the agencies lack a centralized information sharing hub, thus delaying critical response efforts and endangering the public.[2] This thesis contends that these challenges stem from a reliance on ad hoc networks and informal policies, exacerbated by an absent fusion center network, which could foster collaborative intelligence integration.[3]
Against the backdrop of post-9/11 reforms and lessons from global counterterrorism models, the research evaluates the decentralized approach in New York City, particularly between the NYPD and the FDNY. Employing a comparative policy analysis with the United Kingdom’s (UK’s) centralized strategy, this thesis illuminates potential pathways for enhancing collaboration, operational efficiency, threat mitigation, and urban resilience. The UK’s bottom-up approach, anchored in centralized collaboration through initiatives like the Joint Emergency Service Interoperability Principles (JESIP), Counter Terrorism Operations Centre, and Community Policing, exemplifies the efficacy of unified frameworks.[4] The UK’s systematic integration of intelligence, legislative backing, and interagency collaboration through JESIP’s Joint Decision Model provides a stark contrast to New York City’s operational silos, offering actionable insights for reform.[5]
The analysis then leverages Glen Woodbury’s prevention measuring model to assess the effectiveness of New York City’s preparedness in identifying, evaluating, and mitigating threats.[6] This evaluation reveals that while New York City excels in tactical innovations and community engagement, its decentralized framework often hampers real-time intelligence sharing, diminishing its capacity to preempt everyday incidents. Specifically, the lack of a fusion center or other formal policy exacerbates informational silos between the NYPD and FDNY. Thus, critical intelligence often remains isolated, delaying responses and increasing vulnerability to threats or actionable incidents.
This thesis reveals that New York City’s current decentralized, siloed approach, while robust in certain areas, leaves critical gaps in its information sharing infrastructure. By adopting a more centralized model for its extensive public safety capabilities and leveraging evidence-based policymaking, the city can significantly improve its ability to prevent and respond to emergencies through more efficient collaboration—even without a counterterrorism fusion center. This thesis recommends that New York City convert its seldom-used Joint Operations Center into a Networked Operations Center to bridge existing gaps, foster a unified operational picture, and enhance interagency collaboration.[7] It recommends instituting an EMS liaison officer to enhance field-level coordination, expanding access to the Domain Awareness System for broader situational awareness, and transforming the underutilized Joint Operations Center into a Networked Operations Center to promote seamless interagency communication and collaboration. In addition, evidence-based policymaking should guide the distribution of New York City’s extraordinary resources and enhance overall interagency collaboration.
This study serves as a foundational framework for understanding the interplay between intelligence sharing, interagency collaboration, and urban security in the face of modern terrorism challenges. This research contributes to policy discussions on measuring prevention and enhancing urban resilience against terrorism and could serve as a basis for future investigations into interagency intelligence frameworks.
[1] Shawn Cohen et al., “FDNY Battalion Chief Killed When Marijuana Grow House Explodes,” New York Post, September 27, 2016, https://nypost.com/2016/09/27/firefighters-respond-to-reported-house-explosion-in-the-bronx/; Luke Broadwater, “Baltimore Co. Police Say They Rushed to Tell New York of Cop-Killer,” Baltimore Sun, December 23, 2014, https://www.baltimoresun.com/news/crime/bs-md-police-shooting-20141222-story.html; Fire Department of the City of New York, Fatal Injury: Battalion Chief Michael J. Fahy, Battalion 19 (New York: Fire Department of the City of New York, 2017).
[2] “Counterterrorism,” New York City Police Foundation, accessed March 12, 2024, https://www.nycpolicefoundation.org/ourwork/advance/counterterrorism/; Federal Emergency Management Agency, Preparedness Grant Effectiveness Case Study: New York City (Washington, DC: Department of Homeland Security, 2021), https://www.fema.gov/sites/default/files/documents/fema_nyc-case-study_2019.pdf.
[3] Frank Foley, “Why Inter-agency Operations Break Down: US Counterterrorism in Comparative Perspective,” European Journal of International Security 1, no. 2 (July 2016): 161, 173, https://doi.org/10.1017/eis.2016.10; Department of Homeland Security, DHS Fusion Center Engagement and Information Sharing Strategy for 2022–2026 (Washington, DC: Department of Homeland Security, 2022), 4, https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/2022-06/22_0513_ia_dhs-fusion-center-info-sharing-508.pdf.
[4] Tony Kingham, “First Elements of New Counter-Terrorism Operations Centre in London Unveiled,” Border Security Report, July 1, 2021, https://www.border-security-report.com/first-elements-of-new-counter-terrorism-operations-centre-in-london-unveiled/; Joint Emergency Services Interoperability Principles, Joint Doctrine: The Interoperability Framework, version 3.1 (Hertfordshire, UK: Joint Emergency Services Interoperability Principles, 2024), https://www.jesip.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2022/03/JESIP-Joint-Doctrine-Update-April-2024-Web.pdf.
[5] Joint Emergency Services Interoperability Principles, Joint Doctrine; Curt Taylor Griffiths, Interagency Communication, Collaboration, and Interoperability within Police Services and between Police Services and Other Emergency Services: Report for Mass Casualty Commission (Simon Fraser University, 2022), 33, https://curtgriffiths.com/wp-content/uploads/2023/07/COMM0058936.pdf.
[6] Glen Woodbury, “Measuring Prevention,” Homeland Security Affairs 1, no. 7 (Summer 2005), https://www.hsaj.org/resources/uploads/2022/05/1.1.7.pdf.
[7] Kaz Daughtry, “Inside NYPD’s Joint Operations Center,” LinkedIn, November 2024, https://www.linkedin.com/posts/kaz-daughtry-3b31292a7_inside-nypds-joint-operations-center-the-activity-7249441677256323073-pSsf?utm_source=share&utm_medium=member_desktop.
