– Executive Summary –
Mass violence is a part of the American experience and one of the most significant homeland security issues. Despite the crime control and prevention mandates of most police agencies, U.S. law enforcement primarily focuses on responding to, not preventing, these incidents. Significant police training and emphasis have been directed toward running to the sound of gunfire and stopping the shooter but at that point more damage has been done to the cultural fabric of American society. At the same time, prevention has been focused mainly on single hot-button political topics like firearms possession, mental health access, or other legislative reforms. All of these reforms have required significant political will, which has not existed since 1989 when the case studies for this thesis begin. However, an alternative path for law enforcement and communities exists in the form of Behavioral Threat Assessment and Management (BTAM), which represents a science-based preventative framework of significant promise for the prevention of mass violence.
The research question “how could behavioral threat assessment and management become a smart practice for Kentucky law enforcement to help address the problem of mass violent attacks” seeks to provide clarity for Kentucky specifically for the proposed BTAM model. Nationally, the FBI, DHS, and Secret Service are spearheading programs modeling BTAM, but based on variables in state and local laws and policies, those federal agencies are not able to develop a single model for states to follow. At the time of this writing, BTAM programs exist in two Kentucky police agencies, but as the program grows, Kentucky can stand as a model nationally for a dual approach to mass violence, emphasizing not only response but prevention.
When first exposed to the concepts of BTAM, many ask if the program requires law enforcement to profile suspects like the FBI’s famous efforts of profiling serial killers. To this end, the history of what came to be known as offender profiling is explored to show the limited efficacy of the practice. Profilers relied on “common psychiatric principles” with a “blend of science, intuition, and hope.”[1] Alternatively, BTAM relies on a team of stakeholders, including law enforcement, mental health providers, and communities informed by the massive data set that has been analyzed from the actions and behaviors of mass shooters to create a common list of behaviors present in those suspected of planning an attack. Using these behaviors to assess the at-risk person gives law enforcement or mental health professionals more confidence to help mitigate risk while giving those closest to the at-risk a duty to observe and warn based on data-driven behaviors.
To practically apply the principles of BTAM in hindsight, this thesis relies on three cases of Kentucky mass violence. None of the analyses in this thesis are intended to show wrongdoing on the part of anyone but those who perpetrated the acts of violence. First, early in the modern mass violence phenomenon, the 1989 attack at Standard Gravure in Louisville, Kentucky, is analyzed. Significant warning behaviors went unreported by family, friends, and co-workers of the shooter. Rather, information related to the planned attack was siloed by individuals in the life of the shooter who likely could not imagine a rampage of violence at a workplace in 1989. However, even in 1989, had reports been made to the police, a prevention strategy would have likely emerged, given all the information leaked by the shooter, but counterfactually, the application of BTAM is shown as a realistic prevention strategy in that case. Second, the 1997 mass shooting at Heath High School near Paducah, Kentucky, is analyzed. Again, warning behaviors went unreported by those closest to the shooter, counterfactually showing the utility of BTAM as a prevention strategy. Finally, analysis is conducted on the 2023 Louisville, Kentucky, Old National Bank shooting, which represents the most recent mass shooting in Kentucky. This case underscores the limitations of BTAM as a single solution, as the program was in place at the time of the shooting. Behaviors intended to be relied on to aid in prevention were present but only visible in hindsight. The Old National Bank case departs from the standard spree-type killing and shows that ideologically motivated violence may be more difficult to prevent with BTAM, but with community-wide education, prevention may be possible.
The findings in the thesis demonstrate the promise of BTAM in mass violence prevention by including prevention strategies along with response protocols for the entire community. Instead of continued siloing, that is, the failure in communication between responsible parties, all stakeholders must work together to adopt a preventative mindset and use the principles of behavioral threat assessment for preventative efforts. Like the single solution and oft-mentioned legislative reforms, BTAM is not intended as the only remedy for mass violence but does offer a solid tool for stakeholders. However, the model provided by the Louisville Metro Police is scalable to police agencies of every size in the Commonwealth of Kentucky, and it can provide national leadership in the prevention space.
The recommendations given in the thesis are in line with options given at the national level by the FBI, DHS, and Secret Service. Those recommendations include the expansion of BTAM throughout the Commonwealth of Kentucky with available training free from DHS for state and local police. Police agencies should build a multidisciplinary team of school administrators, mental health providers, and other named stakeholders to encourage communication and create partnerships to create intervention mechanisms. Wider community engagement is explored, determining that the community is a primary stakeholder and can be developed into partners in the prevention of mass violence incidents. Challenges in the implementation of the BTAM can emerge, but the experience of the Louisville Metro Police Department is relied upon to show a path forward that can be modeled by other police agencies in Kentucky. Finally, to make BTAM work for the prevention of mass violence, it will require a cultural mindset shift to a program that has scientific backing and has proven value across the United States. The adoption of behavioral threat assessment is extremely limited in police agencies, especially in Kentucky, not as a representation of the value of the program but rather as a reflection of the lack of programmatic exposure. Mass violence is a topic of extreme concern to citizens, but the topic can be taboo as many know the problem exists but want it to exist elsewhere. Understanding that the Kentucky approach to mass violence has reflected national models and still has not been spared from mass violence makes the necessity for a shift in prevention to be added to the response-dominated model to create a safer Kentucky and then a safer nation.
[1] James A. Brussel, Casebook of a Crime Psychiatrist, 3rd ed. (New York: Bernard Geis Associates, 1968), 45.
