Unity of effort in homeland response operations has proven over the last decade to be an elusive target. National Guard contributions to homeland response are no exception. Much effort has gone into creation of a dual status commander, and rightfully so. But, much low hanging fruit remains in the form of improvements to National Guard preparedness.
A plan, type, source, report cycle supports a National Guard concept for preparedness that enables unity of effort in homeland response operations. The plan, type, source, report concept successfully satisfies a rigorous set of selection criteria and deserves evaluation as an overarching National Guard concept that can be supported by the fifty-four commanders in chief of the National Guard of the various States.
Smith, David W. “The Plan, Type, Source, Report Cycle: A Unifying Concept for National Guard Preparedness.” Homeland Security Affairs 9, Article 11 (July 2013). https://www.hsaj.org/articles/248
The 376-year history of the National Guard consistently reflects the dedication, endurance and innovation necessary to remain a relevant force throughout our Nation’s history. The National Guard began the new millennium as a strategic reserve force and transformed into an operational force standing shoulder-to-shoulder in Air Force and Army formations throughout the world. On the home front, National Guard response to disasters and even catastrophic events has been record setting, and led to the creation of operational headquarters in each state that lead military response within those states’ borders. But, it’s not a focus on the past that keeps us relevant. So I ask, are Americans getting the utmost from this national treasure we call the Guard? In the pages that follow, I propose a plan, type, source, report cycle, which will form the core of a National Guard preparedness concept.
ESTIMATE OF STRATEGIC SITUATION
The National Guard operates at the intersection of homeland security and national defense. Federal and state dual sovereignty is manifest in the military instrument of national power by the US Constitution’s creation of a centralized Army and Navy at the federal level and a decentralized military arm given each state: the National Guard. The constitution of each state places the National Guard under command of the governor of that state. Subsequent federal legislation charges the National Guard of the several states with defense of the nation, as a reserve of the Army or Air Force, subject to presidential “call up” or mobilization. This signature dual mission defines the National Guard. In this way, our founding fathers ensured the mission of securing the homeland would be shared between fifty-four commanders in chief (CINC), the governors of the fifty states and three territories, and the president.
Events of the past dozen years have not changed the National Guard dual mission; rather the requirements and expectations were thrust to new heights. The attacks on September 11th, Hurricane Katrina, and a decade at war sparked a transformation of the National Guard from a strategic reserve force, capable of providing forces, to an operational force, providing ready forces and the capability to employ forces in the homeland in support of the governors. Lieutenant General (Retired) Steven Blum, the chief of the National Guard Bureau (NGB) in 2003, recognized this expanding dual mission and proposed a joint headquarters and other operational capabilities in each state, territory, and the District of Columbia (referred to as “the states”). The US Congress later codified the formation of a Joint Force Headquarters (JFHQ) in each state.
The Council of Governors was formed in 2010 by Executive Order 13528 and the National Defense Authorization Act of 2008. It is comprised of ten governors who work on behalf of all governors to improve coordination of federal military forces and National Guard forces responding to a disaster situation. The Council provides the states, the Department of Defense (DoD), NGB and the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) a collaborative vehicle to improve unity of effort. Unity of effort is a national strategic objective that supports securing the homeland. Establishing a dual status commander (DSC) as the “usual and customary command and control arrangement” for planned and no-notice events was an early accomplishment of the Council; the role and responsibilities of the DSC are more fully explained in the Council’s “Joint Action Plan for Developing Unity of Effort.” The DSC addresses a unity of effort challenge identified in several reviews and audits of homeland response operations where improved integration of federal and state operations was recommended. The DSC and the new National Guard joint capabilities, in addition to the half million airmen and soldiers who form Air National Guard and Army National Guard units, provides the governors with expanded means for conducting operations in the state.
Preparedness and the National Guard
The DSC is only the first of the five-part Joint Action Plan for Developing Unity of Effort that was unanimously approved by the Council. Also included in this plan are Shared Situational Awareness; Joint, Reception, Staging, Onward Movement and Integration (JRSOI); Mission Assignments (MA)/Pre-Scripted Mission Assignments (PSMA); and Planning. Shared Situational Awareness includes “the sharing of location and availability of state and Federal military units potentially able to provide military support to civil authorities”. In addition, “Governments use PSMAs to assist in planning and to reduce the time it takes to deploy response resources.” When taken along with planning, this charge represents a significant National Guard investment in preparedness.
National preparedness is defined in the September 2011 National Preparedness Goal (NPG), as the actions taken to plan, organize, equip, train, and exercise to build and sustain the capabilities necessary to prevent, protect against, mitigate the effects of, respond to, and recover from those threats that pose the greatest risk to the security of the nation. The National Preparedness System (NPS) supports the NPG and defines capability as the means to accomplish a mission, function, or objective based on the performance of related tasks, under specified conditions, to target levels of performance. The NPS includes six components: identifying and assessing risks, estimating the level of capabilities required, building and sustaining those capabilities, developing and implementing plans, validating and monitoring progress, and reviewing and updating efforts. In addition to the NPS, the National Response Framework (NRF) and the National Incident Management System (NIMS) guide all partners in response operations. The National Guard brings a tremendous amount of potential capability in support of “a secure and resilient nation” and is implicitly included in the NPG.
Historically, DoD policy held that response capability was resident in, or “derivative” of, warfighting capability. As a result, DoD resources could not be expended in support of preparedness, only warfighting readiness. DoD assets prepare for domestic operations after a lead federal agency generates a requirement following an incident. Readiness is cyclical and timed to peak in support of the DoD combatant commander (CCDR). If preparedness equals readiness, then it is a zero sum game for National Guard units; they can either fight or support domestic contingencies. But, since many required domestic operations capabilities are “subsets” of the unit’s full warfighting capability, units that are “amber” or “red” and do not meet the standard for warfighting (at a given time) may possess significant levels of preparedness. This unreported preparedness provides a key source of support for homeland response operations while minimizing direct competition with the warfight – significantly enhancing National Guard dual use. Governors, as commanders in chief of the National Guard forces of their state, are not bound by the DoD policy, but the vast majority of the resourcing supporting those forces comes from DoD and is governed by the policy. This reactive strategy is a poor fit for the military’s first responders, the National Guard.
In a 2005 article, then Maj. Gen. and Adjutant General of Washington Timothy J. Lowenberg wrote:
The United States enters the 21st Century with unresolved questions about what our national defense and homeland security strategies should be. The life safety of our citizens and the future of our nation hang in the balance. Now, as at the founding of our nation, the states and the central federal government must work in harmony to assure our collective safety and security. Governors, as State Commanders in Chief, must take a central role in shaping our national policy on use of military force. The Adjutants General stand ready to assist in this historic endeavor.
The role of the governors in homeland security strategy is essential to developing unity of effort in the homeland.
Theater Strategy is defined in Joint Publication 1-02 as “concepts and courses of action directed toward securing the objectives of national and multinational (could be read “multistate”) policies and strategies through the synchronized and integrated employment of military forces and other instruments of national power.” The Joint Action Plan offers guidance on developing unity of effort towards securing the homeland, a National strategic objective. National Guard means to support governors in securing the homeland are developing. National Guard ends (dual mission) have expanded. Now, the “ways” remain to be transformed. The National Guard must move beyond a reactive, default strategy to a way that enables governors to take the lead in employing the military instrument of national power in response to disasters and to secure the homeland when authorized.
A successful concept for preparedness depends on efficiently adapting and growing capabilities to meet evolving missions and requirements. Leveraging the National Guard dual mission and appropriately resourcing it implies the ability to measure cost and benefit and development of a process to link the two. Christine Wormuth describes the impact of such a disconnect on the development of homeland security capabilities:
The lack of a formal validation process to connect requirements identification to budgeting has resulted in a sort of lowest common denominator approach to developing capabilities for homeland security. Only those capabilities on which all stakeholders agree inside a particular federal department, or which can generate sufficient support in Congress, are actually funded.
A rationale to systematically measure National Guard contributions to homeland response operations is needed. Competing resourcing alternatives for preparedness must be quantitatively compared and analyzed based on measures of cost and benefit. If resourcing decisions are made only on the basis of qualitative versus quantitative analysis, then capability that is maintained on “stand by” yet was not “called up” is easily overlooked (and under resourced).
Finally, no strategic estimate is complete without addressing risk, defined as a mismatch among the ends, ways, and means. A mismatch between demanding ends, a sizable capability (means), and ways built on reactive policies yields underutilized National Guard capacity, unnecessary competition between the two components of the dual mission, and greater loss of life and property due to slowed response times. Against the risk presented by uncertainty, the best insurance is mutual support and enabled Crisis Action Planning (CAP). A robust preparedness common operating picture is a powerful tool for planners making adjustments after an incident occurs.
The organizational risk to the National Guard is an erosion of relevance due to gradual loss or degradation of its dual mission, with resulting loss of synergy, and loss of value leading to reductions in force structure (means). The operational capability building within each state’s JFHQ over the last ten years is also at risk. The ultimate value of operational capability is the employment of military forces (as in homeland response operations), not solely the generation and readiness of Air Force and Army units (the old State Area Command mission).
Develop a concept that best employs all National Guard means to accomplish the dual mission of the National Guard by leveraging preparedness to integrate National Guard capability into state and federal homeland response operations and synchronize the requirements of the governors and the president into one mutually supported theater strategy for the homeland.
A number of criteria must be satisfied by a National Guard Preparedness concept to warrant selection and evaluation against other concepts or courses of action. The concept must comply with and “nest within” federal guidance and leverage the autonomy and authority of the states. Such a concept must enable the fifty-four JFHQ to synchronize their dual mission in order to realize the lead military response role envisioned by Congress in The National Guard Empowerment Acts. It must provide structure and “common language” in support of interoperability, yet foster innovation, collaboration, and creative problem solving. This concept must facilitate a preparedness common operating picture (COP) that supports response operations and CAP. The successful concept must set the conditions for unity of effort between federal and state, civil and military, and state-to-state, and include the use of the Emergency Management Assistance Compact (EMAC). It must support a process of continuous improvement focused by the laser of metrics. Ultimately, it must be “built for speed,” enabling rapid domestic deployment and employment. And, the concept must enable the National Guard to maintain the unprecedented support to the combatant commanders demonstrated over the past decade.
The answer is a plan, type, source, report cycle forming the core of a National Guard preparedness concept. Strategic concept is defined in DoD Joint Publication 1-02 as:
[The] course of action accepted as the result of the estimate of the strategic situation. It is a statement of what is to be done in broad terms sufficiently flexible to permit its use in framing the military, diplomatic, economic, informational, and other measures which stem from it.
Certainly national guidance and strategy for securing the homeland is in place, but a stubborn disconnect continues to challenge unity of effort. That gap lies at the theater level and is the target of this National Guard preparedness concept requiring a collective agreement of the fifty-four commanders in chief.
The concept begins with the adjutants general and their Joint Force Headquarters supporting their governor’s contingency planning efforts to define the National Guard capabilities required for each contingency. The governor’s lead planner or representative then nominates these capabilities for “typing” per the National Incident Management System (NIMS). All typed National Guard capability definitions are shared in a common, accessible system with all other state and National Guard planners. The typed National Guard capabilities are measureable units of National Guard preparedness and become interoperable building blocks for interlocking supported and supporting plans at all levels. The adjutant general and JFHQ source all missions, state contingency plans, and federal requirements, ensuring all are covered. This includes recommending state authorities coordinate and preplan EMAC and Request for Assistance (RFA) sources. National Guard Commanders report the preparedness status of any capability they are sourced to provide in a common, secure system. Training and exercises support all segments of the cycle with lessons learned from exercises and actual operations providing feedback to increase National Guard preparedness.
Planning is the foundation of preparedness. Each jurisdiction starts with planning in order to satisfy its unique responsibilities. All jurisdictions generally share in common a few components: they receive guidance from appropriate authorities, collaborate with as many partners as possible, create plans (including securing approval from authorities), conduct exercises testing those plans, and evaluate and assess their results in order to improve. The challenge, especially of a catastrophic event, becomes the “interlocking” of all these plans created by the affected and supporting jurisdictions horizontally and vertically to save the most lives and property and most quickly restore government services and public confidence.
Figure 1: Planning Portion of Preparedness Cycle
“All disasters are local disasters” and planning during a disaster begins with the Incident Command (IC) or Unified Command (UC) Incident Action Plan (IAP). According to NIMS, the IAP is created by the IC/UC during the response and covers the next twelve to twenty-four hours of operations. Local jurisdictions’ planning efforts, therefore, focus on an estimate or anticipation of the IAP for a given event (from one to hundreds of IAP in a given response). The anticipation of IAP during response forms the basis of planning accomplished by all jurisdictions during the preparedness phase, even though preparedness precedes response.
The complexities of planning for a catastrophic event make this a daunting task. During Hurricane Katrina, hundreds of local jurisdictions were directly affected and thousands more supported the response effort. It is often noted that a “common language” is essential to facilitate this complex planning process. Fortunately, NIMS provides a common language used in IAP base plans. It is the common “typing” of the various assets or capabilities used by the IC/UC in response operations. Resource typing is categorizing, by capability, the resources requested, deployed and used in incidents. Measurable standards identifying resource capabilities and performance levels serve as the basis for categories. Resource users at all levels use these standards to identify and inventory resources. Universal, well-defined, quantifiable capabilities act as interoperable building blocks upon which plans can be built and interlocked.
Plans created by local jurisdictions inform planners laterally at neighboring jurisdictions who may plan to provide mutual support. The use of typed capabilities adds speed and certainty to the process of finding and filling the gaps in the supported jurisdiction’s response plan. All partners reading the plan have a clear understanding of what is needed. State level planners are informed by the plans of local jurisdictions (both affected and supported) and they too benefit from the use of typed capabilities – allowing state capabilities to identify and fill gaps at the local level completely with little waste. Likewise, shared understanding of the typed capability enhances state-to-state mutual support by EMAC. Finally, federal regional planners are informed and empowered to contribute quickly, accurately, and efficiently with federal capabilities.
It is at the state level that the state National Guard and the JFHQ plug into this planning process. As the supporting headquarters, JFHQ planners carefully receive and understand the state’s requirement for National Guard capabilities to support each plan. They then work closely with state planners to clearly define these National Guard capabilities in terms common to the supported civilian jurisdiction. In this way they interlock planning efforts with the supported jurisdiction(s) and begin to generate the interoperable building blocks that form the base of this complex planning task. Each jurisdiction, and each JFHQ, is provided maximum flexibility – to use an existing typed capability or customize one in partnership with civil authorities. The capability must be well defined in order to deliver interoperability for civilian and military partners. All partners, vertically and horizontally, know what the capability consists of, what it can do, and even have an estimate of the cost to employ it.
JFHQ contingency plans based on well-defined National Guard capabilities along with sponsorship of the supported civil authority moves the cycle from plan to type.
Figure 2: Typing Portion of Preparedness Cycle
The planning process generates National Guard capabilities vetted by the appropriate civil authorities. These capabilities are clearly defined in the plan by JFHQ and civilian emergency planners. This definition includes, but is not limited to, function, task/condition/standard, personnel, equipment, training, response time, and estimated cost to employ. At this point the capability is unique to this plan and this set of partners. In order to facilitate interoperability, the capability must be typed in terms common to all partners. The civilian authority that approves the plan then sponsors the capabilities for inclusion in a national “clearinghouse” or registry for response capabilities. Once included in this national registry, the capability becomes the interoperable building block that allows the plan to be interlocked with supporting plans of all other jurisdictions from local through federal.
Flexibility is afforded each and every jurisdiction to “tailor” exactly the capability needed and still have it universally understood by all partners and jurisdictions. Planners may also choose a capability that has previously been typed in the national registry. And, they may choose an existing typed capability and modify it in their plan. New National Guard capability can be defined at any time or point in the cycle, or during response operations, in order to support the needs of the IC/UC. The appropriate civil authority and JFHQ can send this for typing after the fact. What exists in the national registry of typed capabilities are common start points, or known way points, from which responders can shift as necessary during homeland response operations in order to create capability for any unanticipated requirement.
The well-defined and typed National Guard capability provides the “basis” for preparedness, a measurable unit. In addition to meeting the standard for typing, a capability definition must provide the detail necessary to support the EMAC and the unit providing the capability. EMAC requires number of personnel, equipment, response time, an estimated cost, etc. Simply defining task, condition and standard lacks sufficient detail to estimate cost, a critical variable in selecting a capability for EMAC. Also, the National Guard unit commander sourced to provide the capability in the next segment of the cycle requires sufficient detail to prepare that capability and a measure to evaluate and assess the capability in order to report preparedness during the report segment of the cycle. Rarely will this level of preparedness mirror levels of readiness required of the unit by its warfighting mission.
Typed capabilities identified in contingency plans, along with Army Force Generation (ARFORGEN)/Air Expeditionary Force (AEF) warfighting requirements, move the cycle to source.
Figure 3: Source Portion of Preparedness Cycle
The state’s JFHQ is uniquely positioned to support synchronization and sourcing of the dual mission – warfighting requirements through ARFORGEN/AEF and domestic contingencies. The JFHQ determines the best sourcing solution among its Air and Army units, ensuring that both missions are supported and any shortfalls or “gaps” are covered by EMAC or RFA, once approved by the appropriate state civil authority.
Each capability is sourced against the lowest level of command that contains all the parts required to form the capability. For example, a company may provide two capabilities or a battalion may provide a separate single capability from portions of two of its companies. This predictability empowers the sourced unit to focus efforts on just the personnel, equipment, and training required to generate the required capability. Waiting, wondering, and wasted effort are reduced. The sourced unit must understand, develop, and maintain the capability, as well as, mobilize and deploy it and provide feedback on the process. The unit commander also has a responsibility for reporting the status of the capability. (More details on reporting are included in the next segment of the cycle.) Sourcing also establishes a physical location of the capability, a key factor in determining response time.
A unit sourced with a capability along with the commander’s assessment of that capability’s preparedness level move the cycle to report.
Figure 4: Report Portion of Preparedness Cycle
Responsibility for and authority to report readiness in military units resides with the unit commander. Preparedness reporting respects this proven, time-tested process by leveraging the unit commander to report preparedness status. The commander’s assessment relies on a holistic evaluation of the ability to project the capability into the near future. The report provides detail indicating what deficiencies, if any, exist and what measures are required to correct them. Preparedness reporting is by unit identification code (Army) or unit type code (Air) with reference to the plan the capability is sourced against. Because the capability is typed, the details of the composition, response time, and estimated cost are readily referenced in the system. The unit’s location and contact information is included, further increasing the value as a common operating picture (COP) tool.
The DoD, through the NGB, is the logical “proponent” of the preparedness reporting system and maintains this repository of preparedness data, ensuring ready access for all with appropriate clearance and need to know. The states must have lightning fast access to this data through their JFHQ, just as defense coordinating officers and defense coordinating elements support Federal Emergency Management Agency regional planners and operations centers. The system must leverage technology securely to meet this requirement. The preparedness COP created supplies visibility both horizontally and vertically to find and plug gaps, support EMAC, and even CAP. All military homeland response planners and operators have access to this interoperable system. Decision makers are supported with a system that contains all prepared capability with location, response time, contact info, and even estimated cost. The preparedness reporting system or COP becomes a tool for the operators executing homeland response operations. As capabilities are activated they can be checked out in the preparedness reporting system and entered into a tracking system for deployment.
Figure 5: National Guard Preparedness Cycle
Closing the Loop
Conditions are set for homeland response operations with the establishment of the report portion of the cycle, but the cycle is not complete. Lessons learned and reviews generated by exercises advance the cycle back to plan in order to review and update existing plans or generate a new plan, typed capability, sourcing, or reporting status as needed. Likewise, training and exercises support each segment of the cycle as well. The exercises themselves follow the Joint Exercise Life Cycle found in the Joint Training System. The JFHQ simultaneously coordinates with state authorities to ensure compliance with the Homeland Security Exercise and Evaluation Program. In addition to exercises, an actual event, new guidance, changes in threats or technologies, or other planning inputs may also initiate a review or new requirement that moves the cycle back to plan.
The table below summarizes the selection criteria as applied to the plan, type, source, report cycle.
Table 1: Selection Criteria in the Plan, Type, Source, Report Cycle
|“Nested” in federal guidance
|Leverage autonomy/authority of the states/territories||Based on the dual sovereignty between State and Federal. Does not infringe on authority or creativity of the State.||✓|
|Enable synchronization of NG Dual Mission||Empower JFHQs to use/report capability in ALL units, no under-utilized capacity.||✓|
|Enhanced Interoperability||Interoperable system/process with metrics understood by civil and military.||✓|
|Foster innovation, collaboration, and creative problem solving||ALL are rewarded for innovation without limits or top-down standardization. Collaboration is enabled by COP, shared plans, and interoperable building blocks.||✓|
|Common Operating Picture||Shared contingency plans, capability status, location in common, secure system.||✓|
|Supports process of continuous improvement||Quantifies Preparedness. If we can’t measure it, how do we know if we are Improving it?||✓|
|Enable rapid Domestic Response||Requires getting “left of the bang”, landfall, quake epicenter, etc… Unity of Effort begins well prior to an event during Preparedness.||✓|
|Maintain “Warfighter” support for “away game”||DoD deployments and contingencies get top priority, and capability resident in ALL other units is identified, defined and measured against a domestic contingency plan.||✓|
|Unity of Effort- “One of the Great Challenges of our time”||Unified action requires a unifying Strategy maximizing National Guard Preparedness.||✓|
“Achieving unity of effort in homeland response is a complex challenge, among the greatest of our age… It requires us to develop new ways of thinking about and managing homeland response capabilities, before disaster strikes.” Preparedness and a plan, type, source, report cycle do not guarantee success, however. Response operations have the ultimate vote, but this concept sets the conditions that enable successful response. It is a proactive strategy that is at work 24/7/365 to improve National Guard contributions to homeland response. Typing of capabilities provides a measurable unit of preparedness. Sourcing a typed capability against a National Guard unit provides an authority to report the status of the capability, the commander. Homeland response capabilities resident in “red” and “amber” warfighting units are not obscured by a singular reliance on readiness. All the ingredients are present for a shared reporting system able to support a preparedness COP in near real time. This collaborative system facilitates shared learning among planners and enables us to quantitatively sum National Guard contributions to homeland response. In the fog of a “no-notice” event, all partners, at all jurisdictions, have visibility (through shared plans and reporting in a Preparedness COP) of the intent of any entity that is “incommunicado.” One broken link in the chain doesn’t paralyze all other partners from beginning to build the bridge around it that stabilizes the situation.
The principle of dual sovereignty in our Constitution intends the military power of the National Guard to be decentralized. The situation creates a significant challenge to unity of effort in homeland response, but yields a unique advantage in the form of many varied sources of solutions to complex response problems. A common, collaborative system for preparedness data, shared by planners, facilitates shared learning and sets the conditions for adaptive learning as planners and operators design, experiment, and collaborate. Taken along with the typing clearinghouse, it provides a quick, low cost and effective way to compare plans and capabilities across the fifty-four JFHQ.
We must come to terms with the dissonances found in each state. Instead of ignoring or diminishing each state’s individuality, we must embrace it. This will require a mastery of fundamental principles…and a mechanism by which we can accelerate the pace of development.
The plan, type, source, report cycle satisfies a rigorous set of selection criteria and deserves evaluation by the adjutants general of the several states and the chief, National Guard Bureau, as a National Guard Preparedness concept capable of fully supporting the “Joint Action Plan for Developing Unity of Effort.”
About the Author
Lieutenant Colonel David W. Smith has served the North Carolina National Guard in numerous assignments for over twenty years. He currently serves as Joint Force Headquarters (JFHQ) deputy G1. His past assignments include commander, 30th Brigade Special Troops Battalion, chief of Future Operations for JFHQ-J3, operations officer for the JFHQ-J7, and 30th Heavy Brigade Combat Team planner. He is a 2006 graduate of the US Army Command and General Staff Officer Non-resident Course and the Joint Forces Staff College Joint and Combined Warfighting School class 06-04.
 Maj. Gen. Timothy J. Lowenberg, “The Role of the National Guard in National Defense and Homeland Security,” National Guard (Washington, DC: National Guard Association of the United States, September 2005): 97-102.
 Department of Defense Directive (DoDD), Number 5105.83, National Guard Joint Force Headquarters State (Washington, DC: The Pentagon, January 2011).
 Dave Heineman, Governor of Nebraska, speech on “Unity of Effort” at National Guard Bureau/US Northern Command Domestic Preparedness Workshop (National Harbor, MD, February 2012).
 Council of Governors, Joint Action Plan for Developing Unity of Effort (Washington, DC: Council of Governors, March 2011).
 Department of Homeland Security (DHS), National Preparedness Goal (Washington, DC: DHS, September 2011).
 Department of Homeland Security (DHS), National Preparedness System (Washington, DC: DHS, November 2011).
 Department of Defense (DoD), Strategy for Homeland Defense and Civil Support (Washington, DC: The Pentagon, June 2005), 3.
 Commission on the National Guard and Reserves (CNGR), Second Report to Congress (Washington, DC: CNGR, March 2007): 42-44.
 Maj. Gen. Timothy J. Lowenberg, “The Role of the National Guard in National Defense and Homeland Security,” National Guard (Washington, DC: National Guard Association of the United States, September 2005): 102.
 Department of Defense (DoD), Joint Publication 1-02 (Washington, DC: The Pentagon, As Amended Through 31 January 2011), 370.
 Christine Wormuth, “The Next Catastrophe: Ready or Not?” The Washington Quarterly (Washington, DC: January 2009): 100-101.
 Derek S. Reveron and James L. Cook, “Developing Strategists: Translating National Strategy into Theater Strategy,” Joint Force Quarterly 55, 4th Quarter (2009): p 24.
 DoD, Joint Publication 1-02, 348.
 FEMA, Emergency Management Institute, National Incident Management System (NIMS) Incident Command System (ICS) Training courses (IS-200/201).
 H. Steven Blum and Kerry McIntyre, “Enabling Unity of Effort in Homeland Response Operations,” U.S. Army Strategic Studies Institute (Carlisle Barracks, PA: April 2012), xii.
This article was originally published at the URLs https://www.hsaj.org/?article=9.1.11 and https://www.hsaj.org/?fullarticle=9.1.11.
Copyright © 2013 by the author(s). Homeland Security Affairs is an academic journal available free of charge to individuals and institutions. Because the purpose of this publication is the widest possible dissemination of knowledge, copies of this journal and the articles contained herein may be printed or downloaded and redistributed for personal, research or educational purposes free of charge and without permission. Any commercial use of Homeland Security Affairs or the articles published herein is expressly prohibited without the written consent of the copyright holder. The copyright of all articles published in Homeland Security Affairs rests with the author(s) of the article. Homeland Security Affairs is the online journal of the Naval Postgraduate School Center for Homeland Defense and Security (CHDS). https://www.hsaj.org