– Executive Summary –
For over three decades, community policing has proven itself to be an effective tool to address crime and disorder within local communities.[1] Since 9/11, however, many local police agencies have been chipping away at community policing programs in order to meet new homeland security responsibilities. The concern is that sidestepping a policing practice with a 30-year track record of success, while theoretically good for counterterrorism, may prove counterproductive in the larger scheme.
With this in mind, the current study set out to answer the question: Do newly acquired homeland security responsibilities require police agencies to reduce or eliminate community policing programs or can homeland security mandates be effectively integrated into an agency’s already established community policing philosophy? In order to answer this question, the study examined 720 municipal law enforcement agencies from all 50 states that responded to a variety of community policing and homeland security questions in both the 2000 (pre-9/11) and 2007 (most recent) Bureau of Justice Statistics Law Enforcement Management and Administrative Statistics surveys. These 720 law enforcement agencies incorporate most major law enforcement agencies in the nation, including all Tier 1 Urban Area Security Initiative (UASI) agencies, as well as a representative sample of smaller agencies distributed throughout the country.
The study findings provide strong evidence that, since 9/11, police agencies have significantly reduced the attention given to community policing, while at the same time substantially increasing their focus on homeland security. Most notable is the fact that the percentage of full-time officers dedicated to community policing by local police agencies declined by 56 percent, while the total number of community officers, nationwide, dropped by 54 percent, going from 103,000 to 47,000, between 2000 and 2007.[2] While some differences were noted relating to agency size and budget, highly significant declines in the number of community policing officers were strong across all jurisdictions and fiscal characteristics, large and small. Furthermore, local police agency involvement in most specific community policing elements also fell substantially from 2000 to 2007. This included significant decreases in the number of agencies maintaining specialized community policing units (-39 percent); agencies encouraging their officers to engage in SARA problem-solving projects (-19 percent); agencies maintaining a formal community policing plan (-16 percent); and agencies conducting in-service community policing training (-20 percent).[3]
As for homeland security initiatives, the study makes it clear that local police agencies of all sizes have begun actively engaging in a wide variety of counterterrorism preparedness activities, activities that these agencies likely had not contemplated until after the events of 9/11. For example, since 9/11, the amount of Joint Terrorism Task Forces in the U.S. have increased by some 300 percent.[4] Thousands of local police officers are now assigned to these task forces. General counterterrorism responsibilities engaged in by local police agencies as of 2007 have also increased significantly, including the maintenance of formal written terrorism response plans (54 percent), regular participation in emergency preparedness exercises (62 percent), and increased presence of police officers at critical infrastructures located within their community (33 percent).[5] Some agencies also took their counterterrorism preparedness and prevention strategies further by engaging in community oriented counterterrorism activities, such as disseminating counterterrorism information to the public (33 percent), holding homeland security community meetings (26 percent), partnering with culturally diverse populations (13 percent), and conducting public terrorism anti-fear campaigns (four percent).[6]
Overall, the study determined that local police agencies that committed a higher percentage officers to community policing in 2000 also engaged in significantly more counterterrorism preparedness elements in 2007. Additionally, the study findings support the fact that local police agencies participating in higher levels of counterterrorism elements in 2007 had experienced a significantly greater reduction in the percentage of community policing officers within their agency from 2000 to 2007. These findings lend credence to the notion that many officers that had been committed to community policing in 2000 were likely retasked to homeland security related operations by 2007.[7]
Questioning the wisdom of these sort of reallocations, this study provides convincing evidence that the strategies used to further community policing and homeland security are complementary. Moreover, the study strongly suggests that police agencies that integrate community policing and homeland security not only excel in counterterrorism preparedness, but also enjoy lower crime rates. This was determined by considering the frequencies with which local police agencies engaged in general counterterrorism elements separately from community oriented counterterrorism elements and then comparing the two approaches to community clearance and crime rates. In doing so, the study found that, although police agencies are far more likely to participate in general counterterrorism elements than community oriented counterterrorism elements, it is the engaging in community oriented counterterrorism elements that appears to lead to a lower community crime rate.
In summary, the answer to our original question of whether homeland security mandates can be effectively integrated into an agency’s already established community policing philosophy is a qualified “yes.” By integrating homeland security responsibilities into a local police agencies already established and proven community policing philosophy, it is possible for police agencies to successfully address both local crime and national security needs. This makes the concept of community oriented counterterrorism a preferred organizational practice.
Perhaps the most important finding of the current study, however, is that organizational success is related more to the types of activities engaged in than the specific labels placed on police programs or officers. That is, it is an agency’s commitment to utilizing a community oriented approach when engaging in counterterrorism initiatives that makes the difference, irrespective of whether these activities are performed by specialized counterterrorism officers, community police officers, or any combination thereof. This is a critical distinction as the findings recommend an about-face for many local police agencies, large and small, creating important policy implications for law enforcement throughout the nation. Embracing the concept of community oriented counterterrorism as a single overarching organization philosophy, however, holds great promise for achieving both better crime control and terrorism prevention for local communities.
[1]Allison Chappell, and Sarah Gibson. “Community Policing and Homeland Security Policing: Friend or Foe?” Criminal Justice Police Review 20, no. 3 (2009): 326–43.
[2]Brian A. Reaves, Law Enforcement Management and Administrative Statistics Survey: Local Police Departments, 2007(Washington, DC: U.S.Department of Justice Office of Justice Programs, 2010), http://www.bjs.gov/index.cfm?ty=pbdetail&iid=1750
[3]Reaves, Law Enforcement Management, 2007;Brian A. Reaves,Law Enforcement Management and Administrative Statistics Survey: Local Police Departments, 2000 (Washington, DC: U.S.Department of Justice Office of Justice Programs, 2003), http://www.bjs.gov/index.cfm?ty=pbdetail&iid=1750
[4] Federal Bureau of Investigations, Protecting America: National Task Force Wages War on Terror. Federal Bureau of Investigations. Protecting America: National Task Force Wages War on Terror, August 19, 2008. http://www.fbi.gov/news/stories/2008/august/njttf_081908.
[5]Reaves, Law Enforcement Management, 2000; Reaves, Law Enforcement Management, 2007.
[6]Reaves, Law Enforcement Management, 2000; Reaves, Law Enforcement Management and, 2007.
[7]Reaves, Law Enforcement Management, 2000; Reaves, Law Enforcement Management, 2007.
