Unified Command, as a part of the National Incident Management System (NIMS), was successfully used in the state-federal response to the catastrophic disaster caused by Hurricane Katrina in Mississippi in 2005.
By William Carwile
For the September 2022 issue, Homeland Security Affairs has produced a collection of book reviews by CHDS faculty. Each faculty member was asked to identify and review a book that they have used in a CHDS class and which they believe provides a significant contribution to Homeland Security as an academic discipline. Read more.
The concept of predictable surprises, i.e. failures to take preventative action in the face of known threats, was outlined by Max Bazerman and Michael Watkins in their book by the same name. This paper discusses predictable surprises as primarily organizational events that result from failure of organizational processes to support surprise-avoidance rather than surprise-conducive actions by individual members.
By Larry Irons
The national strategy for the protection of critical infrastructure and key assets is not working due to a number of failed strategies, which this article examines in detail.
By Ted G. Lewis and Rudy Darken
Beginning in 2004, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) began to define and implement a national domestic all-hazards preparedness goal, intended to improve the nation’s preparedness for national catastrophes, including terrorist attacks.
By Sharon Caudle
As a maritime nation, the United States is economically and strategically reliant on its ports, a fact well known to our potential enemies in the Global War on Terror. A successful attack against maritime critical infrastructure in our ports has the potential to cause major economic disruption and create mass casualties and conflagration.
By Robert Watts
Under the new “Joint Force” concept of operations model, the U.S. Navy has taken on added prevention responsibilities that include strategic and operational responses to asymmetric warfare.
By David Longshore
How do we know if prevention is working? Not only is the measurement of prevention activities possible, the methodologies of “how” to measure already exist in numerous processes. Additionally, the definitions of “what” to measure have been both experienced and discussed.
By Glen Woodbury
The July 7, 2005 attacks on London inescapably direct public attention to our own transportation system. But eventually – as happened after the Madrid bombings in 2004 – public vigilance will wane.
By Christopher Bellavita
The events of September 11, 2001 caused the nation’s leaders to accelerate existing border programs aimed at prevention. Traditionally, the “prevention” of border violations has involved interdiction (physically impeding any incursion while it is occurring), preemption (through routine screening to intercept illegal shipments, weapons, people, or other illicit cargo), and deterrence (where an action taken means a potential violator does not plan or even attempt an illegal entry).
By Robert Bach
Almost four years have gone by since the United States formally joined the global war on terrorism. Yet something stops us from giving as much attention to preventing terrorism as we give to preparing to respond to the next attack. One reason is a homeland security system that is designed for response rather than prevention.
By Christopher Bellavita