The national strategy for the protection of critical infrastructure and key assets is not working due to a number of failed strategies, which this article examines in detail.

By Ted G. Lewis and Rudy Darken

Beginning in 2004, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) began to define and implement a national domestic all-hazards preparedness goal, intended to improve the nation’s preparedness for national catastrophes, including terrorist attacks.

By Sharon Caudle

As a maritime nation, the United States is economically and strategically reliant on its ports, a fact well known to our potential enemies in the Global War on Terror. A successful attack against maritime critical infrastructure in our ports has the potential to cause major economic disruption and create mass casualties and conflagration.

By Robert Watts

Under the new “Joint Force” concept of operations model, the U.S. Navy has taken on added prevention responsibilities that include strategic and operational responses to asymmetric warfare.

By David Longshore

How do we know if prevention is working? Not only is the measurement of prevention activities possible, the methodologies of “how” to measure already exist in numerous processes. Additionally, the definitions of “what” to measure have been both experienced and discussed.

By Glen Woodbury

The July 7, 2005 attacks on London inescapably direct public attention to our own transportation system. But eventually – as happened after the Madrid bombings in 2004 – public vigilance will wane.

By Christopher Bellavita

The events of September 11, 2001 caused the nation’s leaders to accelerate existing border programs aimed at prevention. Traditionally, the “prevention” of border violations has involved interdiction (physically impeding any incursion while it is occurring), preemption (through routine screening to intercept illegal shipments, weapons, people, or other illicit cargo), and deterrence (where an action taken means a potential violator does not plan or even attempt an illegal entry).

By Robert Bach

Almost four years have gone by since the United States formally joined the global war on terrorism. Yet something stops us from giving as much attention to preventing terrorism as we give to preparing to respond to the next attack. One reason is a homeland security system that is designed for response rather than prevention.

By Christopher Bellavita

Terrorist threat actors are both cunning and adaptive, relying on surprise to overcome security measures. For this reason, military and security planners must embrace a more flexible, comprehensive, and comprehensible approach to contingency planning – a method based on neither threats nor scenarios exclusively, but rather on integrating these two approaches into a planning process based on capabilities.

By Thomas Goss